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Abstract 
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is increasingly drawing international 
attension and coastal states strengthen their efforts to address it as a matter of 
priority due to its severe implications for food, economic, environmental and social 
security. As the largest archipelagic country in the world, this is especially 
problematic for Indonesia. In this already complex geographical and security 
environment, the authors test the hypothesis that IUU fishing and fisheries crime(s) 
classify as transnational organized criminal activities. The article argues that IUU 
fishing is much more than simply a fisheries management issue, since it goes hand 
in hand with fisheries crime. As a result, although the two concepts are quite distinct, 
they are so closely interlinked and interrelated throughout the entire value chain of 
marine fisheries, that they can only be managed effectively collectively by 
understanding them both within the framework of transnational organized crime. To 
make this argument, the research utilizes qualitative and quantitative data collected 
from approximately two thousand trafficked fishers, rescued in 2015 from slavery 
conditions while stranded in two remote Indonesian locations: Benjina on Aru island 
and on Ambon island. The article’s findings also unveil new trends relating to the 
inner workings of the illegal fishing industry, in four different, yet interlinked 
categories: recruitment patterns and target groups; document forgery; forced labor 
and abuse; and fisheries violations. The paper concludes by confirming the 
hypothesis and highlights that IUU fishing provides the ideal (illegal) environment for 
fisheries crimes and other forms of transnational organized crimes to flourish.  
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1.Introduction  
 
‘One of the reasons I prioritize the eradication of illegal fishing is not only 
because we are losing trillions of rupiah due to illegal fishing, but also 
because illegal fishing is often a vehicle for other crimes, such as people 
smuggling, drugs smuggling and slavery.’  
Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesian Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
(IOM 2015a:1). 
The statement above highlights the significance and implications of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing for Indonesia and justifies the prioritization 
of its eradication by the sitting Indonesian government. The annual cost of IUU 
fishing for Indonesia is estimated at around USD 3 billion (ASEANnews 2017). 
Indonesia’s own estimates of total annual loss including lost tariffs and risk of 
permanent damage to possibly 65% of their coral reefs places the number much 
higher, at USD 20 billion (Parameswaran 2016, Santosa 2016).  In addition to this 
economic cost and the implications of illegal fishing practices both for coastal 
communities’ livelihoods (Jaiteh 2017) and for the marine ecosystem, the Indonesian 
minister stressed several more lucrative crimes that are not encapsulated by what 
the term IUU represents but which clearly increase illicit profits. Human trafficking 
alone is estimated to generate over USD 150 billion in annual profits for criminal 
enterprises globally (ILO 2014:13). These are crimes that are traditionally considered 
to be only indirectly attached – if at all – to this particular maritime security challenge 
and, consequently, are not perceived as integral components of IUU fishing per se. 
Instead, they have been considered as distinct maritime crimes (UN General 
Assembly 2008:17-33) with potential links occasionally existing between them (Percy 
2016: 157-9).   
In 2015, two particular and interlinked incidents within the Indonesian fishing industry 
captured the public’s attention in Indonesia, the biggest archipelagic country in the 
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world, and triggered the research conducted for this article. The incidents took place 
on two remote East Indonesian locations, Benjina on Aru island and on Ambon 
island. Both involved extensive human trafficking and forced labor in parallel with 
IUU fishing activities (Townsend 2015, Salim 2015). Thousands of foreign nationals 
from regional countries, such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, had been 
rescued from trafficking and their testimonies offered valuable qualitative and 
quantitative data – and some tragic insights – for this article.  
The aim of this article is twofold: first, to  test the existing hypothesis that IUU fishing 
and fisheries crime(s) classify as transnational organized crime (TOC) (Osterblom et 
all 2011; Liddick 2014). Second, to offer invaluable insight and unveil new 
transnational organized crime trends throughout the supply chain of the (illegal) 
fishing industry in Indonesia. Structurally, the article first puts IUU fishing and 
fisheries crime in context, and identifies the differences – both in theory and in 
practice – between these forms of crime and TOC. After discussing its hypothesis in 
detail, the paper then focuses on the Southeast Asian region and Indonesia, in 
particular, to explore the extent to which IUU fishing and fisheries crime is 
understood, classified and addressed as TOC. The analysis of data collected from 
the trafficked victims in these  cases, is then utilized to test the hypothesis and 
indicate the actual transnational and organized crime nature of these crimes. Based 
on the evidence provided, the article also presents new TOC trends in the fishing 
industry, in four main categories: recruitment patterns and target groups, document 
forgery, forced labor and abuse, and fisheries violations.  
It concludes, that findings from the two investigated incidents in the Indonesian 
fishing industry provide sufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis that IUU fishing 
and fisheries crime classify as TOC. They transcend issues directly challenging 
fisheries management. The unveiled recruitment patterns, document forgery, forced 
labor and illegal fishing practices indicate that only if they are recognized and treated 
collectively as TOC, could adequate and efficient responses be formed.     
          
2. The illegal fishing and fisheries crime hypothesis 
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In recent years, IUU fishing has increasingly attracted international attention due to 
the challenges it poses to environmental, food and economic security (US NIC 
2016). Its annual cost to the world is estimated as being between USD 10 and 24 
billion (Seafish 2017) and, in his 2008 report to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, ‘Oceans and the Law of the Sea’, the United Nations’ Secretary General 
identified IUU fishing as one of the seven main threats to maritime security (UN 
General Assembly 2008:17-33).i However, IUU fishing is mostly understood as a 
non-traditional security challenge as it does not threaten the physical survival of 
states (Osterblom et all 2011:261) and mainly involves non-state actors, (Pomeroy et 
al 2016a: 94-5, Chapsos 2015: 70-72). Nevertheless, its impact upon livelihoods, 
food security, and human security – from coastal communities (Pomeroy et al 
2016b:28) and small island states (Malcolm and Murday 2017:240, Malcolm 
2017:242) through to a global level – is documented in many existing maritime 
security strategies. In the African Union’s 2050 Integrated Maritime (AIM) strategy, 
for example, IUU fishing holds a prominent role since fishing makes a vital 
contribution to the food and nutritional security of over 200 million Africans and 
provides income for over 10 million (AU 2014: 8). The European Union approaches 
IUU fishing both through the lens of the environmental risks and protection of 
economic interests (EU 2014:7-8). The United Kingdom’s National Strategy for 
Maritime Security goes one step further and, additionally to citing the economic and 
food security challenges stemming from the IUU fishing on a global level, it highlights 
the potential links with piracy off Somalia (UK 2014:31-35). The United States 
National Intelligence Council also identifies IUU fishing as a crime with global 
implications for food and economic security, which benefits transnational crime and 
contributes to human trafficking (US NIC 2016:5). 
The variety of the documented and reported challenges is to some extent reflected in 
the distinction between the three components of the term, IUU: illegal, unreported 
and unregulated activities. The definitions of these highlight the differences and also 
the links between them: ‘Illegal fishing’ refers to fishing activities that are conducted 
by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a state, without the 
permission of that state or in contravention of the laws and regulations of that state 
(See, for example, Fig. 1 – unlicensed border hopping). ‘Unreported fishing’ refers to 
activities that are unreported or deliberately misreported to proper authorities (See, 
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for example, Fig. 1 – misreporting/ not reporting catches). And finally the term 
‘unregulated’ refers to fishing conducted by vessels without nationality, those flying 
the flag of a country not party to a Regional Fisheries Management Organizationii 
(RFMO) or, more generally, fishing in a manner which contravenes the regulations of 
the RFMO or in a manner inconsistent with state responsibilities for the conservation 
of living marine resources under international law. (See, for example, Fig. 1 – fishing 
in marine protected area) (Liddick 2014:292, Bondaroff et al 2015:12-13). 
 
Fig. 1: Common forms of IUU fishing. (Source: US NIC 2016:6) 
 
In 2013, Interpol introduced the new concept of fisheries crime (De Coning 
2016:147), which encapsulates ‘…those criminal offences defined as such in 
domestic law (including, but not limited to, such offences in marine living resources 
acts) committed within the fisheries sector, with the ‘fisheries sector’ referring to the 
entire value chain from vessel registration to the sale of the commodity’ (De Coning 
and Witbooi (2015:213). Fisheries crime includes a long list of (traditional) organized 
crimes, such as human trafficking, document fraud, drug trafficking, corruption, tax 
and customs evasion, etc. which occur within the fishing industry. As such, it is of 
great importance to better understand the links and relationship between the IUU 
fishing and fisheries crime(s) concepts.   
6 
 
From the provided definitions, it is evident that IUU fishing is understood as a 
fisheries management issue mainly focused on the extraction of marine living 
resources, which falls under the mandate of the United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). Yet, approaching IUU fishing as a matter of industry 
regulation only is flawed; instead, IUU fishing has to be recognized and treated as 
TOC, due to its scale, complexity and diversity (Haenlein 2017). Furthermore,  , IUU 
fishing is a profit-driven transnational crime, linked to weak, incompetent and 
corrupted governance (Liddick 2014: 309-310), hence its conceptualization as TOC 
makes efforts to set political priorities and identify the necessary actions and 
resources to address it easier (Osterblom et all 2011:261).  Additionally, the 
coexistence of IUU fishing with fisheries crimes, creates even more TOC dynamics. 
Understanding these interrelations through the lens of TOC would provide an 
essential tool to complement international – hitherto inefficient and inadequate – 
efforts to tackle IUU fishing (De Coning and Witbooi 2015:210-211). It is the aim of 
this article to test exactly this hypothesis: that IUU fishing must be understood 
alongside fisheries crime, and through the lens of TOC. Although it becomes clear 
that IUU fishing and fisheries crime are entirely distinct by definition, they are also 
closely interlinked and interrelated. Irrespective of their conceptual and theoretical 
discrepancies, the latter’s existence depends on the former and vice versa, which 
results in their classification as TOC collectively.  
 
3. Understanding IUU fishing and fisheries crime, through the lens of 
transnational organized crime   
Transnational organized crime (TOC) has been defined as  
‘… a cross-border misconduct, which entails avoidable and unnecessary harm 
to society, which is serious enough to warrant state intervention and similar to 
other kinds of acts criminalized in the countries concerned or by international 
law. Crime will be viewed as cross-border when the offenders or victims are 
located in or operate through more than one country’ (Passas 1999:401). 
Finckenauer (2005:79-81) cites the definition adopted in the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC)iii and identifies TOC 
as a new menace, arguing that although its definition could have been applied for 
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example to pirate groups of the 16th century, its contemporary scale is 
unprecedented, and it is hence a new reality of the 21st century.     
As global markets and communications have become more interconnected, criminal 
activities and security challenges have developed and evolved with the times. 
Although IUU fishing is one such area of growing concern, unfortunately, this 
development came long after the introduction of UNCTOC with its primary focus on 
crimes like trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling, and firearms trafficking. 
Consequently, while UNCTOC makes special provision for such transnational 
criminal activities, it does not include similar provisions for IUU fishing.  
The international body with the mandate to oversee activities focused on combatting 
transnational crime, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), while 
not explicitly acknowledging IUU fishing as TOC per se, has commissioned studies 
into linkages between the latter and the fishing industry. In particular, the UNODC 
commissioned a desk review focused on TOC and the fishing industry in 2012. The 
review considered the inputs from an expert group, UNODC materials, and other 
information related to crime in the fishing sector. One of the recommendations from 
the ‘Expert Group Meeting: Combatting Transnational Organized Crime Committed 
at Sea’ was that transnational organized fisheries crime conducted by an organized 
crime group be clearly demarcated from IUU fishing for the purposes of UNODC 
mandates (UNODC 2013b:49).  
In another report, focused on fisheries crime, the UNODC exposed extensive 
criminal activities, forced labor, and abuse in the fishing industry, where both children 
and fishers were trafficked by organized crime networks. In parallel with these, the 
networks were involved with illegal fishing (both in terms of their practices and their 
focus on endangered species) and ‘laundering’ illegal catches on the international 
fisheries market, a practice that can only be achieved through the use of fraudulent 
documents, transshipments and corruption. The report also revealed that in most of 
the cases documented, these organized crime networks exploited the fishing 
industry operators’ skills and knowledge of the maritime domain and recruited them 
in order to expand their illicit activities. Hence, fishing vessels in the reported cases 
were used as a legitimate business cover to facilitate smuggling of migrants, and 
trafficking of people, drugs and weapons (UNODC 2011).  
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In a similar vein, another UNODC report on transnational crime in Southeast Asia 
exposes the extent to which human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, forced labor 
and sexual exploitation are directly and/or indirectly linked to the fishing industry 
(UNODC 2013a:6,7,9,16). Ultimately, however, the UNODC’s approach advocates 
that IUU fishing is not, itself, recognized as a transnational criminal activity although 
it does involve such activities, including human trafficking for labor exploitation of 
crew members. From this, it can be presumed that IUU fishing uses the cover of the 
ostensibly legitimate commercial sector to hide transnational criminal activity and, as 
Liddick (2014:297) asserts, it is ‘…perpetrated by private commercial enterprises and 
organized crime groups driven by the opportunity for large profits’. 
Matching the growing relevance of fisheries crime to their mandate, UNODC 
launched an ongoing global campaign on Fisheries Crime in 2016, recognizing 
‘organized criminal organizations engage in fisheries crime with relative impunity’ 
(UNODC 2016:2). Similarly, Interpol (2017) notes trafficking in the fishing industry 
has become a ‘business model’ to ‘minimize cost and maximize catch’ and in order 
to detect and combat fisheries crime, it established a dedicated ‘Fisheries Crime 
Working Group’ within their Environmental Security sub-directorate.  
The development of TOC has, to some extent, been aligned with globalization; 
indeed, Williams (2012) further asserts that transnational criminals have been some 
of the biggest beneficiaries of this process. Furthermore, he highlights that the ever 
increasing volume of international trade results in the respectively increasing 
difficulty in regulating it. Williams (1994:96) also criticizes the notion that organized 
crime groups are just a domestic law and order issue, arguing that they pose very 
serious challenges to both national and international security. As such crime groups 
transcend national borders, they can operate in one state and extend their reach 
beyond the borders of that state with impunity (Williams 1995).  
Transnational crime is also marked by the harm it does to the population and the 
state. Shelley (2011:135) asserts that human trafficking is one of the most rapidly 
growing forms of transnational crime. She maintains that the activity undermines the 
integrity of the state, weakens political institutions, and undermines civil society and 
human rights (Shelley 1995:463, 467). Albanese (2012:1, 12) suggests that 
transnational crimes are distinguished by their multinational nature and  cross-border 
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impact and categorizes them as having three broad objectives: provision of illicit 
goods, provision of illicit services, and the infiltration of business or government 
operations (See Table 1). 
 
Provision of Illicit Goods  Provision of Illicit Services        Infiltration of Business   
                                                                                                                            or Government 
Drug trafficking    Human trafficking          Extortion and racketeering 
Stolen property    Cybercrime and fraud          Money Laundering 
Counterfeiting    Commercial vices          Corruption 
     (e.g., illegal sex & gambling) 
 
Table 1: Classification of Transnational Crimes (Source: Albanese, 2012:2) 
 
The review above outlines some of the essential criteria and traits that qualify illegal 
activities as TOCs. Within this context, the next section seeks to shed more light and 
improve our understanding on cases where the same groups/actors perpetrate both 
IUU fishing and other TOC activities (such as human trafficking, forced labor, 
document forgery, smuggling of non-marine fishery products). In order to achieve 
this, we look in more depth at the Indonesian case study and the research conducted 
in the aftermath of two major incidents of human trafficking in the Indonesian fishing 
industry: the Benjina case (Townsend 2015) and the Ambon case (Salim 2015). 
 
4. The Indonesian Case Study  
4.1  The Southeast Asian and Indonesian environment  
Chapsos and Malcolm (2017) investigated the Indonesian stakeholders’ 
understanding, priorities and approach regarding maritime security challenges. Their 
article notes that although IUU fishing is seen as the predominant challenge in the 
country, fisheries crimes such as smuggling and trafficking (of humans, drugs, 
weapons) by sea are all quite high on the priorities list too (Chapsos and Malcolm 
2017:181-2). As this article’s introductory quote from the Indonesian Minister reveals, 
combatting IUU fishing has become a focal point of the government’s approach 
based on a realization that it causes harm both to the Indonesian economy and to 
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the fishers involved in the illegal activity (IOM 2015a:1). This has coincided with the 
identification of transnational organized criminal activity in IUU fishing in Indonesia 
(IOM, KKP and Coventry University 2016). The use of crew trafficked for exploitative 
labor has heightened awareness of IUU fishing and led to an unprecedented 
government effort to address issues related to the human rights of crew members 
and the practice of IUU fishing (Antaranews 2016, Tempo 2016). 
Recognizing the interconnectedness of threats, Indonesia has pushed for IUU to be 
classified as a TOC. The Head of ‘Indonesia’s Presidential Task Force to Combat 
Illegal Fishing’, stated that the linkages with a number of criminal activities and 
characteristics mean that fisheries crime meets the international definition of TOC 
(ARF 2016:5). 
Regional institutions have acknowledged the threat posed by non-traditional security 
(NTS) issues and TOC for many years. The region’s foremost security institution, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) had transnational crime placed firmly on the agenda 
of ASEAN states with the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime (1997) and 
the Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime (1998) 
committing ASEAN member states to combat TOC. 
This focus was further strengthened with the release of the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community (APSC) Blueprint, and its stated commitment to ‘…strengthen 
cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues, particularly in combating 
transnational crimes and other transboundary challenges’ (ASEAN 2009:12). This 
included ASEAN states’ cooperation in combatting IUU fishing (ASEAN 2009:13). 
The shift towards acknowledging IUU fishing as a serious cross-border criminal issue 
and a maritime security challenge, reflects the region’s gradual adoption of 
mechanisms recognizing the threat posed by TOC. 
Globally, Southeast Asia is considered to be ‘…the principal location for trafficking 
persons for forced labor into the fishing industry’ (Graham 2011:2). Thai fishing 
vessels operating in Indonesia and Malaysia were associated with a higher degree of 
trafficking than other areas (IOM Thailand 2011:9). Furthermore, it is ‘…estimated 
1,000 foreign vessels conduct IUU fishing in 12 per cent of Indonesia’s territorial 
waters each year’ (Caballero-Anthony & Hangzo 2013:248).  
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Within this framework, two specific and interlinked incidents of trafficking by sea in 
2015 captured public attention in Indonesia. The first took place in Benjina, on the 
remote East Indonesian island Aru where hundreds of stranded foreign fishers, from 
Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, had been rescued from trafficking in the 
fisheries sector. In the second incident hundreds of victims of trafficking were 
rescued from foreign fishing boats in Ambon (IOM 2015:1). These two tragic 
incidents will be utilized as this article’s case studies, in order to test the hypothesis 
that IUU fishing and fisheries crime classify as TOC and investigate in depth the 
potential links between them in this particular region.  
 
4.2  Methodology: documenting experiences of trafficked victims in the 
Indonesian fishing industry  
In August 2015, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Indonesia 
surveyed 285 fishers who had been rescued as victims of trafficking on fishing 
vessels in Indonesia (IOM Indonesia 2015b:1). IOM expanded their normal 
questionnaire assessing victims of trafficking to also capture data related toIUU 
fishing and fisheries crime to profile how forced labor was being utilized.    The 
questionnaire consisted of questions about the vessel(s) they worked on, the hours 
worked, the types of trawls used, transshipment, licenses, flags flown, and fish and 
marine products. The fishers were also asked to match illustrations of vessels and 
trawls with the ones utilized in their work environment. 
The survey was conducted, with interpreters when needed, in a safe and secure 
environment away from the fishing companies. They represented part of a much 
larger group of over 1,342 fishers from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand 
who had been rescued from trafficking in Benjina and Ambon in Eastern Indonesia in 
2015. 
Additional primary data is drawn from interviews conducted by the IOM Indonesia 
staff with a broader sample of 1,342 rescued fishers, contained in a joint research 
report compiled by IOM Indonesia, the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries, and Coventry University (IOM, KKP and Coventry University 2016). This 
report also included supporting data obtained from an audit of 1,132 ex-foreign 
vessels operating in Indonesian waters, conducted in 2015 by the Indonesian 
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Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) and law enforcement agencies, which 
identified many criminal activities and breaches of fisheries legislation. The report 
came as a product of the long term and well-established research partnership 
between IOM Indonesia and Coventry University. In particular, it focused on the links 
between illegal fishing, exploitation and trafficking in the Indonesian fishing industry 
and clearly outlined the deceptive recruitment practices and mechanisms utilized by 
the fishing companies to control their workforce.  
The analysis of the trafficked victims’ responses to the questionnaire and the data 
collected from the interviews provide an insight into the modus operandi of the 
criminals and the conditions at sea and on land for the fishers.  
 
4.3  Unveiling new transnational organized crime trends in the Indonesian fishing 
industry   
a. Recruitment patterns and target groups 
The recruitment pattern involved a high degree of organization, with mass 
recruitment of fishers through deception across four countries, namely Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, mainly by recruiters visiting their villages. Although 
most were told that they would work in the fishing industry, they were given the false 
impression that it is an easy occupation not requiring special skills or training, but 
only strength and stamina. They were further tempted by the perception that it’s 
easier to save money while working in the fishing industry -even with a lower wage 
compared to other land-based occupations- as while at sea their daily needs will be 
covered by the fishing company and they will have nowhere to spend their money. 
Furthermore, the majority of the fishing companies in Thailand still accept 
undocumented and/or unregistered foreign unskilled workers, whereas all other 
sectors require legal documents –such as for example an Identification Card- for 
potential employees. Therefore, on the one hand the victim avoids the cost of 
procuring a legal document for employment; on the other hand, the employers save 
the high cost they would have to spend on registering them but also minimize the 
risk of been caught due to the victims’ continuous presence on board the vessels 
and long time spent at sea (IOM Indonesia, 2015b:2-3, IOM, KKP & Coventry 
2016:41-9).  
13 
 
It is noteworthy that all the victims were male, and the majority (90%) between 20-40 
years of age. They were all of poor, or very poor financial status and most had very 
low levels of education, or none at all. Equally interesting is that the marital status of 
almost 70% of the victims was single, or generally unattached, which made their 
recruitment easier: they would be more willing to work overseas due to limited 
responsibility towards wife and/or children. Most were offered jobs as fishermen and 
some specifically in the Thai fishing industry. 70% of the victims had to pay a 
‘recruitment fee’ to the agent (USD 2-4,000) but given their financial situation, almost 
half of them were required to sign a debt contract prior to their departure. This was 
later used as another means of pressure for forced labor and excessive working 
hours, where they supposedly had to work harder in order to repay it. After the 
successful recruitment, many were held in safe-houses in Thailand under the control 
of armed guards. They were transported under guard to the port and placed on 
waiting fishing vessels which took them to Indonesian waters (ibid). .  
b. Document Forgery 
The majority of the fishers (79%) in the Ambon case reported that they had a 
Seaman’s Book, but they never held them in their possession as they were 
confiscated by the recruiters and thereafter held by the captain of the vessel as a 
means to control the movement of the fishers and to prevent any chance of escape. 
In both cases (Ambon and Benjina), the majority of victims from Thailand (85%), 
Myanmar (87%), Cambodia (50%) and all from Laos neither ever had nor ever been 
issued with a Seaman Book, and were undocumented. The remaining fishers who 
didn’t have one (30% in total), were provided with false identities in order to be 
issued a Seaman’s Book and this presumably requires the use of corrupt officials to 
produce fraudulent Seaman’s Books on a large scale. An analysis of the issuing 
offices in Thailand suggests official collusion in the process with multiple fraudulent 
Seaman’s Books with consecutive numbers issued to fishers on fishing vessels. An 
examination of the Seaman’s Books showed signs that the photos had been altered, 
with each fisher shown wearing the same clothes and given a false Thai name on 
their document, whether they were from Myanmar, Cambodia or Laos. Apart from 
being a fraudulent document, this also removed the real identity of the fisher and 
made it difficult to identify and locate that individual (IOM Indonesia 2015b:4; IOM, 
KKP & Coventry 2016:64, 87).  
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The criminals also went to great lengths to foil the authorities by disguising vessels 
and using false registration documents and licenses. Some vessels had their 
provenance disguised and were, in effect ‘re-birthed’; records were changed and 
new ones issued to show that they were built in a different location. Vessels’ 
registration papers and licenses were also exchanged between vessels. This was 
seen to be done by throwing documents overboard in a plastic bag and the other 
vessel collecting them (IOM Indonesia 2015b:11). 
c. Forced labor and abuse 
The vast majority (87%) of the fishers interviewed confirmed that it took between one 
to six months to complete one single trip. The working hours for the fishers during 
these long voyages were extreme: 46% worked between 16 and 20 hours per day 
and 32% between 21 and 24 hours per day (IOM Indonesia 2015b:7) (See Fig. 2). 
None of the victims reported working less than 12 hours per day. 
 
Fig. 2: Working hours of trafficked victims onboard fishing vessels 
The long time spent at sea, the excessive working hours and denial of salary 
payments illustrate how the crews were exploited. The remoteness of the locations 
their vessels were fishing made their escape impossible, but the debt contracts and 
confiscation of any available documents increased the means of pressure and 
control over them.  Even on the rare occasions where the vessel was calling at port, 
several guards were placed around it to prevent victims from escaping. 75% of the 
victims reported that they were not allowed to move freely neither on board the 
vessel nor ashore. An overwhelming majority of victims deemed that their living 
quarters were unsanitary and claimed that they were denied adequate food, water 
8%
46%31%
2%
13%
How long is the daily working hours?
10-15 Hours 16-20 Hours 21-24 Hours Under 10 Hours Does Not Answer
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and medical treatment. This also involved the virtual imprisonment of fishers both on 
board vessels and on land, as well as physical abuse, psychological abuse, and the 
killing of some to control the trafficked workforce of fishers. A testimony of a 
Cambodian fisher is indicative of the followed practice:  
‘In Benjina port, every time my ship harboured, I have seen 1-2 dead bodies 
floating on the sea, I had even helped and carry one of the body who happened 
to be a Burma. The port officer will take away those body and dry them out on 
the edge of the beach, wrap them with plastic, and burn them in Benjina island. 
Most of the dead bodies were Burma and Thai” (IOM, KKP & Coventry 2016: 
83).     
Beatings were common and in several cases people were thrown overboard, as 
another Cambodian fisher described:  
“While on board, I often heard the news from the boat radio that several boat 
crews had died, either falling to the ocean, fighting or killed by the other 
crews. While I was working on the boat, I saw with my own eyes more than 7 
dead bodies floating in the sea. Prior to leaving Benjina, I also saw 2 dead 
bodies, they were Thai crews, floating in the sea” (IOM, KKP & Coventry 
2016: 84).  
Witness statements provided by the rescued fishers identified a number of instances 
where officials were seen assisting in the movement and disposal of dead fishers. 
Quoting a Cambodian fisher,  
 “…If a crew is dead, the captain would ask assistance from the local 
government to burn the body on an island across the Benjina island” (IOM, 
KKP & Coventry 2016: 83).  
Another report involves the larger vessels that were used for transshipments, which 
were allegedly responsible for returning fishers to Thailand; foreign nationals would 
continue their journey to their home countries from there. However, a testimony 
suggested that this was a deception:  
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“I was not brave enough to return home with the export ship because I heard 
that they threw Myanmar nationals to the sea once they were on the waters” 
(IOM, KKP & Coventry 2016: 84)   
Benjina, where many of the fishers had been based, had a company prison for the 
fishing companies to imprison fishers and seafarers and a large graveyard for foreign 
crew who died at sea or on land (see Picture 1). Their deaths were never 
investigated (IOM, KKP & Coventry 2016: 65, 83-5).  
 
 
Picture 1: Part of the cemetery in Benjina used to bury victims of trafficking (Source: IOM, KKP & Coventry 
University 2016: 85) 
 
d. Fisheries violations  
The criminals were able to engage in IUU fishing by committing a variety of fisheries 
offences. Some of these were carried out to assist in ‘legitimizing’ the fishing 
operations and others to maintain vessels at sea and away from ports. These 
practices prevented authorities from conducting compliance activities and enforcing 
Indonesian fisheries regulations. It also prevented the authorities from checking the 
crew and the cargo. A clear manifestation of this criminal activity lies in the 
transshipment process and the ability to maintain criminal operations at sea and 
away from the scrutiny of law enforcement. The fishing vessels concerned regularly 
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transshipped their catch at sea. This was in contravention of Indonesian regulations 
requiring vessels to unload the catch at specified ports. Out of the 285 fishers 
interviewed, transshipment had been witnessed by 58% of them (see Fig. 3), and 
78% of these transshipments took place at sea, in either Indonesian or Thai waters. 
The movement was primarily from the fishing vessels to larger vessels used for 
freezing the fish and taking them to markets (IOM Indonesia 2015b:10). 
 
Fig. 3: Fisheries product transshipment 
 
Transshipment allowed the fishing vessels to remain at sea for long periods: 47% of 
fishers reported having spent four to six months at sea while 40% had spent one to 
three months at sea. This practice allowed the fishing companies to maximize the 
catch and keep boats away from ports to evade controls (IOM Indonesia 2015b:7-
10). Transshipment was not only used as a way to transfer fish but also to resupply 
vessels with provisions, and to change crew. Statements from fishers suggested that 
some of the crew members who were moved to the larger transshipment vessel 
never returned home and may have been murdered at sea (IOM,KKP & Coventry 
2016: 84).  
Transshipment at sea was also used to transfer commodities other than marine 
catches (See Fig. 4). Suggestions were made by fishers that some of these transfers 
may have involved goods, such as electronics, foods, snacks, cigarettes, beverages 
and even fishing equipment, all of which were being illegally smuggled into Indonesia 
58%
30%
1%
11%
Have the caught fish or other marine products ever been transshipped 
to other boats in the middle of the sea or at the port?
Yes No Does not know Does Not Answer
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(IOM Indonesia 2015b:10-11). There was no mention of witnessing the movement of 
illicit substances; however, the government audit discovered evidence of illicit drugs 
trafficking aboard some vessels (IOM, KKP & Coventry 2016: 16).  
 
Fig. 4: Transhipment of commodities other than marine catches 
 
The fishing operators were also able to maintain their criminal activities in Indonesia 
through the use of remote coastal communities where they based their operations. 
These areas provided a staging point for IUU fishing not only in Indonesia but also in 
Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste (IOM Indonesia, 2015b:18). For instance, when 
the mass rescue took place on Benjina and Ambon, not all of the trafficked fishers 
managed to escape their servitude and a number of vessels evaded the Indonesian 
authorities and headed for other ports, including at least 30 that sailed to Papua New 
Guinea (Townsend 2015).  
Witness testimony from the Benjina case highlighted the frequent changing of 
vessels’ flags, alternating between Thai and Indonesian flags depending on the 
fishing area. This activity clearly contravenes the law and highlights the premeditated 
behavior and intent to conduct fishing illegally in another state’s waters. Furthermore, 
Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) and the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) 
were tampered with to hide the location of vessels. Fishers stated that the VMS was 
disabled to avoid police patrols when in Indonesian waters (IOM Indonesia 
2015b:13). 
55%
38%
1%
6%
Has there ever been any other stuff or individual (i.e. boat crew) 
being transferred from other boats into your fishing boat?
Yes No Does Not Know Does Not Answer
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The findings of the questionnaire on IUU fishing and fisheries crime completed by 
the 285 fishers are further strengthened by the Indonesian government audit of 
2015.  This found that all of the 1,132 fishing vessels had breached fisheries 
regulations or legislation to some degree. From the audit, the Ministry also found that 
769 of the vessels had committed severe violations and 363 vessels took part in 
general violations. In addition, 168 were found to have crew who had been trafficked 
or were involved in forced labor. The crews of these vessels reported working 
between 18 and 22 hours per day, seven days per week (IOM, KKP & Coventry 
University 2016:19, 21). 
The fisheries violations and fisheries-related violations committed by the 1,132 
vessels included: deactivating the vessel monitoring system (VMS) (73%); using 
foreign seamen and captains (67%); fishing outside the fishing grounds (47%); 
transporting goods to and from the territory of Indonesia without going through 
customs authorities (37%); transshipment at sea (37%); not landing the catch in a 
fishing port (29%); not owning/partnering with a fish processing unit (24%); using 
illegal fuel (23%); forgery of fishing logbooks (17%); trafficking in persons and forced 
labor (10%); and using prohibited fishing gear (2%) (IOM, KKP & Coventry University 
2016:19).  
5.Confirming the hypothesis: IUU fishing and fisheries crime as transnational 
organized crime in Indonesia 
The analysis of the collected data provides an important exposé of the dynamics of 
IUU fishing, its links with fisheries crime(s) and their classification as TOC. In 
particular, the preceding section presented these findings categorized in four 
separate, yet interrelated groups, which provide evidence that the process 
transcends plain fisheries management issues, to include well-financed and 
structured TOC.   
The recruitment pattern unravels a highly organized criminal venture, and highlights 
the transnational criminal nature of these activities operating across multiple 
maritime and land borders. This meets the criteria of the definitions a) adopted in the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations 
Centre for International Crime Prevention, 2000: 48-49); b) provided by Passas 
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(1994); but also confirming Williams’ (1994, 1995, 2012) analysis, as outlined in the 
previous section. 
The extent of document fraud, whether it refers to seaman books or vessel licenses 
and documents, provide evidence that the documented activities meet the criteria set 
out in the definition of organized criminal groups (UNODC 2004:5) and highlight how 
IUU fishing encapsulates several other forms of fisheries crime, such as in this case 
document forgery and corruption.  
The extent of forced labor and exploitation of the fishers, clearly illustrates the 
interdependence between human trafficking and IUU fishing. Focusing on the latter, 
the findings provide evidence of violations relating to all three terms of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing activities, as defined earlier in this article. 
Furthermore, in the examined cases of Benjina and Ambon, there is no doubt that all 
the documented transnationally organized crimes were perpetrated within an equally 
well organized IUU fishing environment. Hence, even if one argues that the identified 
fisheries violations do not constitute transnational organized crimes in themselves, it 
is evident that this well-established illegal fishing environment and network within an 
ostensibly legitimate business used as their cover was utilized to facilitate human 
exploitation and transnational crimes in the most efficient and brutal way, with the 
aim of maximizing the financial profit of the group(s).    
The experiences of trafficked victims documented in this article provide evidence that 
criminal activity such as IUU fishing fits well also in Albanese’ (2012) classification and 
so can be viewed as TOC. The activities that the research found to be taking place 
alongside IUU fishing satisfy all three of Albanese’ objectives (see Table 1): provision 
of illicit goods in terms of both illegally caught fish and commodities other than marine 
catches; provision of illicit services in the form of forced/trafficked labor; and infiltration 
of business or government by the use of front companies and the corruption of officials. 
Thus, the identified links between IUU fishing and fisheries crime, including document 
forgery, trafficking in persons for labor, smuggling, money laundering, and drugs 
trafficking, clearly fall within what constitutes transnational criminal activity according 
to this classification system and they demonstrate that one is vital for the other to 
flourish. The discussed findings also connect IUU fishing with TOC and reaffirm 
Shelley’s (1995, 2011) position in the sense that it poses great harm to the population 
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and the state. The extent of the fisheries crime facilitated within this illegal fishing 
environment, and in particular the documented human trafficking for forced labor and 
abuse of human rights up to the level of homicide leaves no space for doubt on this. 
Companies involved in IUU fishing have maximized regional market opportunities with 
their commodities but have also been drawn deeper into serious criminal activity to 
support it. Such activities that involve corruption and violence affecting both the 
community and state agencies pose a challenge to the state by weakening 
governance mechanisms and eroding government controls.  
6. Conclusion 
This article has tested the hypothesis that IUU fishing and fisheries crime classify as 
TOC, and to achieve that, it utilized qualitative and quantitative primary data 
collected from trafficked fishers in two incidents – Ambon and Benjina- in the 
Indonesian fishing industry. The findings, provide clear and sufficient evidence to 
confirm the hypothesis, as the two case studies indicate that they fulfill all the 
essential criteria discussed in detail in the preceding sections. But additionally to this 
hypothesis testing, the findings offer an invaluable insight and unveil original and 
new trends in the inner workings of these criminal networks. The plethora of IUU 
fishing activities and a range of violations of fisheries laws and regulations, were 
complemented and enabled by large-scale trafficking of fishers from other parts of 
Southeast Asia – effectively into enslavement on fishing vessels and in remote 
Indonesian coastal communities. The recruiters/ traffickers exploited the existing 
levels of corruption to perpetrate massive document forgery which inevitably involves 
and requires corrupt officials and governance structures. They also exploited human 
insecurities such as poverty and low education to target and deceive males of a 
particular age range, with quite limited family commitments and trafficked them on 
board Thai fishing vessels to illegally fish in Indonesian waters. The enslavement of 
the fishers and the control of their movements were further enabled by binding debt 
contracts as they were unable to pay the high recruitment fee, but also by 
confiscating any identification documents so that they wouldn’t even consider to 
escape and travel individually. Victims’ testimonies also reveal the extent of their 
experienced physical and psychological abuse, up to the level of homicide, and a 
broad range of human rights abuses, such as denial of payment of wages, adequate 
food, sanitary facilities, medical care, etc., complete the picture of the environment in 
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which this activity took place. To support these findings, further studies are needed 
to confirm whether IUU fishing and the extent of its links to fisheries crime in other 
parts of the world mirrors that found in Indonesia, with a similar modus operandi on 
the part of the transnational organized criminals.   
TOC in the fisheries sector flourishes because of its high profit, low risk nature and 
difficulties in policing illegal activity in the vast maritime space; this is compounded 
by the obstacles to obtaining witness testimony and the high level of official 
corruption. The treatment of these fishers and seafarers by the fishing operators 
underlines the need for the international community to act against IUU fishing and 
fisheries crime and to recognize and treat them as transnational organized criminal 
activity.  
The undertaken testing of the hypothesis through the presentation of the research 
findings, confirms and clearly presents IUU fishing and fisheries crime as a TOC 
problem (Haenlein 2017; Liddick 2014; Osterblom et all 2011), which implicates a 
wide range of actors, including organized crime groups, commercial fishing 
enterprises and corrupt public officials. In such cases, it is almost impossible to 
isolate what is solely related to the extraction of living marine resources and overlook 
issues concerning living human resources. The complexity of the maritime space in 
security terms does not allow silos for each illegal activity to be understood, 
addressed and suppressed individually. Instead, a more comprehensive and 
inclusive approach is needed to explore, understand and disrupt the linking and 
overlapping of various maritime insecurities. Only when the importance of these 
interconnections is accepted and IUU fishing and fisheries crime are seen as almost 
inseparable and taken as seriously as other transnational organized crimes will they 
become the focus of more intense law enforcement efforts and global scrutiny. 
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